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Abstract: Two of the most discussed concepts in the world of social policy within the 21st century have
been those of food security, and related terms such as “food sovereignty”. With increasing demand for food,
both in amount and variety, in rapidly developing economies (most notably Brazil, India and China), along
with shifts in the location of global agricultural consumption and production (for example, the diversion of
some food grains into ethanol fuel production), national and sub-national governments have come under
increasing pressure to develop explicit strategies for food security. These concerns are also increasingly
supplemented by regional and global crisis around natural resources such as water and fertile lands,
exacerbated by climate change [1].
1. “Security” or “Sovereignty”?
One of the troubles with food security as a concept, however,
is that there is no universal definition for it, or the related clus-
ter of concepts such as right-to-food and food sovereignty.
Indeed, some of the largest clashes on the issue have arisen
not between those supporting and opposing greater govern-
ment involvement in food access on principle, but rather in
the contested space of what this insurance of access should
look like [2]. For instance, if “food security” is defined as
solely a population having access to a set number of calories
per day, what about issues of nutritional variety, cultural ap-
propriateness of the food provided, and sustainability of the
agricultural practices involved in its growing? Furthermore,
if the food provided in order to create this “security” comes
in the form of either food aid or other external imports, does
this not undermine the long-term capacity of local commu-
nities to feed themselves and to freely determine their own
relationship to the global food system? A related question
is at what level the question of food security ought to be
considered; in other words, can a nation overall be “food
secure” (in the sense of having adequate stocks to feed its
population), if some regions or localities continue to, for a
variety of reasons ranging from geographic features to lack
of adequate local distribution mechanisms, experience food
insecurity? At the same time, are purely local approaches
to the question appropriate, or are higher level public policy
strategies necessary? None of these are easy conflicts to
resolve, especially given both the contested, often contra-
dictory, nature of state power and the conflicts of control
over food systems between states, communities and, often
multinational, business corporations.
This set of conflicts over definition and scope has led
some to contest the term “food security” altogether as being
outdated, and instead to push for “food sovereignty” as an
alternative goal. It is usually stated by those pushing this
distinction that the latter term is more holistic and focused
on questions of control, both economic and cultural, over
food systems, as opposed to a solely material focus of food
security. Patel defines the call for food sovereignty as be-
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ing, “precisely about invoking a right to have rights over
food”, meaning that it calls for a reconsideration of food as
a political subject [3]. For food sovereignty to be actualized
under this conception, “requires direct democratic partici-
pation” [3], of producers and consumers in order to shape
the character of the food system, rather than simply being
instrumental parts within it. Such politics forms a sharp
contrast to that pushed by bodies such as the World Trade
Organization, which have often attempted to “legitimate the
rhetoric of trade liberalization to advance neo-liberal food
security” [4]. The WTO and other bodies have often argued
in the context of regional food shortages that food security
and food sovereignty are mutually conflicting goals, given
the interconnected nature of global trade. In other words,
the measure to protect food sovereignty in one nation will
inevitably lead to problems of food security in another by re-
stricting necessary food exports, and as such protectionist
trade policies are primarily to blame for global food short-
ages. Such assertions have led states, particularly those in
the Global South, to push back, asserting, as India’s foreign
minister did in 2008, that “ “every country must first ensure
its own food security” before considering the consequences
for international markets” [4]. In this vision, food security is
intimately linked with Westphalian sovereignty at the level
of the nation-state, and is primarily the responsibility of the
government to achieve. Some states have gone further
than rhetorical pronouncements with this logic, with many
having explicit policy strategies for food sovereignty and
in the case of Ecuador in 2008, constitutionally enshrin-
ing food sovereignty as a right of its citizens [5]. It may
also be said that such a notion posits food security as only
achievable at the jurisdictional level of the state, and that
a notion of global food security is either not achievable as
such or not a relevant consideration to the actions taken
by national governments. In other words, both the security
and sovereignty of food at the level of one nation exist in a
competitive, rather than dependent, dynamic with those of
other nations, with a gain for one representing a potential
loss for another.
At the same time, those people and organizations acting
in favor of food sovereignty are also far from being in agree-
ment on this or any other definition of the term. As Conversi
has noted, the level at which “sovereignty” is situated by
those seeking to create “food sovereignty” is often strik-
ingly different from the Westphalian notion of state-based
sovereignty [6]. Rather, “the subject has moved from the
state to small-scale producers mobilizing, with or without
the state” [6], creating a kind of “sovereignty from below”
through community coalitions and actions. It is important to
note that the emphasis on this form of sovereignty, “largely
originated in response to the global agrarian restricting that
began in the late 1980s”, which posed an existential threat
to traditional methods of food production and distribution,
particularly in countries with a more agrarian economic
base [6]. The culmination of these struggles in terms of
political articulation is often noted as being the founding of
the La Via Campesina international network in 1996, which
coined the term “food sovereignty” and has been largely
responsible for its global popularization. Under such a defi-
nition, a nation proclaiming itself to be “food sovereign” as a
matter of national policy may actually be nothing of the sort,
as this sovereignty may not respect democratic rights of
citizens to participation as full-fledged actors in the food sys-
tem. This notion of participation is sometimes linked to the
“political power of agrarian citizenship to challenge capitalist
relations” [7], by redefining both the rights and obligations
of citizenship through food systems. As such, it is difficult
to determine precisely what the role of government and the
state is in such a conception of food sovereignty, given that
it is often cast a villain in collusion with capitalist powers or
a roadblock to more democratic forms of citizenship.
2. The Market Solution
Given all of these contradictions and contestations within
the policy of creating food security (and/or sovereignty), it is
not surprising that some have wanted to turn to the market
as a kind of panacea to the problem. Under this view, which
is supported by evidence from the replacement of direct
food aid and food vouchers with cash-based assistance in
emergency aid situations, the problem is not so much one
of food security as income security [8]. In other words, by
providing those without access to food with a simple cash
transfer, ability to access existing food markets will be facili-
tated, without the need for direct government interventions
to shape prices or provision of food. Lest this argument
be dismissed purely as naı¨ve “free market” economics, it
should be pointed out that there have indeed been prob-
lems with traditional food aid programs, in that they are
“increasingly being considered ineffective” by aid agencies,
governments and aid recipients themselves [9]. This is both
in the sense that such programs often involve bureaucratic
systems and administrative costs that, “mean far fewer peo-
ple can be beneficiaries, given limited resources” [8], and
that they restrict, sometimes severely, the autonomy of the
beneficiaries. Evidence from cash transfer systems adopted
as aid measures in countries such as Ethiopia have shown
that such cash aid is often used in ways to regenerate lo-
cal food production and economic markets, such as via
investments in a family farm, leading to longer-term food
security in a way that direct food aid would not have. The
cash transfers can, therefore, “promote social respect and
individual autonomy of the poor” [9] by allowing them the
ability to freely invest assets as they see fit and not treating
them as simply objects of charity, but rather economic and
social subjects in their own right. Social welfare can thereby
be enhanced “without imposing the policing, paternalism
and surveillance of the traditional welfare state” [10].
One of the most popular forms of direct cash transfer,
originating in Mexico’s Oportunidades program but now
present across Latin America and moving into other parts
of the Global South [11], is the Conditional Cash Transfer
(CCT) system. Though the exact design of the program
differs between the nations where it has been implemented,
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the basic function is that they “supply monetary benefits
as long as recipients can demonstrate that they have met
certain conditions” [12]. As CCT-benefits are typically re-
stricted to families with children, these conditions most often
include minimum attendance in school and children having
vaccinations and regular medical check-ups. The reasoning
behind the conditions is that such activities will help the
children and their families build “human capital” through
education and good health, thereby breaking a wider “cycle
of poverty” within communities. CCT programs have been
both praised and subject to a critique from activists and
scholars. The most common criticisms have focused on
the “inadequate targeting and means testing by government
agencies responsible for them” [12], meaning that not all of
the intended recipients are able to access the benefits and
that the gendered nature of the program, as the benefits are
usually deposited in the mother’s bank account, may serve
to reinforce female caregiver stereotypes and to off-load
the work of social reproduction onto women without ade-
quate compensation from the state [13]. Nevertheless, the
programs have shown effectiveness at both, reducing par-
ticularly extreme poverty, and increasing school attendance
and educational attainment rates [14]. For this reason,
as well as their relatively low implementation costs, such
programs have been implemented by governments of a
variety of notional ideological positions, albeit with some
distinctions in program design owing to them (with those im-
plemented by more conservative political groupings tending
to be more restrictive in terms of the conditionality).
Amongst Global South nations grappling with the prob-
lems of both food security and poverty relief, two of the
largest are Brazil and India. Though the nations of course
differ in a host of socioeconomic, cultural and geopolitical
respects, they do face similar problems of sharp income
inequality, displacement of rural populations into cities
and increasing battles over land and agricultural owner-
ship. At the same time, both countries have had, until
recently, a long period of sustained economic growth, as
well as centre-left governments (the Workers’ Party in the
case of Brazil, the Indian National Congress in the case
of India), attempting to spread the benefits of that growth
to a wider social strata. The differential approaches that
the social security systems in each nation took in attempt-
ing to address the problem of food security are, therefore,
instructive in understanding how these questions should
be approached on a policy level. Though of course con-
strained in each case by differing economic and political
contexts, as well as path dependencies within each coun-
try’s existing social protection regime, there are lessons
in their successes and failures. Moreover, an approach
which would recognize the best aspects of each policy
program could be instrumental in designing a food se-
curity policy which reconciles institutional and individual
problem levels. As it is “not possible to study the technolo-
gies of power without an analysis of the political rationality
underpinning them” [15], this paper will examine the polit-
ical logics which informed both approaches, with an eye
to seeing how these were played out in their concrete
effects as implemented.
3. The Indian Approach: Expanding “Food Security”
The debate around the question of “food security” and a
broader set of concerns around food access, food and land
rights, foreign capital influence within the food system and
so on [16], has been active in India for some time, with
varying levels of public support and political influence [17].
Though the proximate cause of the Congress government
introducing the National Food Security Act (NFSA, or the
“food security bill”) in 2013 was a 2005 ruling by the Indian
Supreme Court which found that, “citizens of India do in-
deed have a constitutionally guaranteed right to food” [18],
and set out guidelines to determine if this right was being
achieved in practice, the issue was kept on the agenda
by social movements determined to hold the government
accountable to the Court’s ruling. In addition, it should
be noted that several Indian states which, for a variety of
reasons, have a more progressive political stance and a
more active labor movement, had been active in establish-
ing state-level “food security” systems before the national
government acted. This has been particularly noted in the
case of Kerala, which maintains higher social and health
status indicators despite its average level of economic out-
put for an Indian state [19]. These observations point to
the fact that, to the extent that other states or the national
Indian government had not previously implemented such an
approach, the condition of food insecurity, “persists because
the concerns of poor people are invisible and their needs un-
politicised” [20]. This is consistent with Esping-Andersen’s
account of the development of the social democratic wel-
fare state within the European context, which posited that,
“the mobilization of working-class political power resources
affects the distributional and institutional characteristics of
welfare-state development” [21]. Though there is an open
question as to if the Indian social movements which put
pressure on the government could be classed as move-
ments of the “working class” in a purely Marxist sense, they
nevertheless were movements of a dispossessed class (or
classes) of people, which did seek and enact changes to
state policy through both electoral and other means.
In this sense, the NFSA is fundamentally a work of im-
plementation, of both the Supreme Court ruling and the
principles advanced by the movements which informed it,
however partial this implementation may turn out to be. In
terms of its concrete function, the Act does several things.
Most notably, it expands and reforms the existing food sub-
sidy and rationing system within India in order to cover more
citizens, whilst also reducing the prices paid by them for
subsidized staple foods [22]. The Act, in effect, represented
an expansion of the existing Public Distribution System for
basic food grains and cooking oils in India, along with a roll-
out of targeted food initiatives aimed at feeding particularly
“vulnerable” population sub-groups (most particularly chil-
dren and pregnant women). The critical change, however,
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was that the Act both converted existing food aid programs
into legally-enshrined “rights”, as opposed to conditional
“assistance” that they were previously defined as, and ex-
panded some programs, such as the Midday Meal Scheme
in schools, to the whole of a target population regardless of
income (i.e. all children now receive meals in school without
a means-test). The aim of this approach was both to lessen
potential for corruption or improper aid selectivity at the
local level by simplifying food assistance distribution and to
destigmatize receiving food aid by eliminating means-tests
for some aid programs. Also uncluded in the bill was funding
for a large expansion of child development service centres,
which offer integrated medical, nutritional and educational
initiatives, largely in rural communities [23]. In short, by
placing the emphasis on in-kind benefits and services, as
well as making these services universal access (with the
exception of directly subsidized food grains, which never-
theless are intended to reach a majority of the population),
the Indian government was taking the view that, instead of
facilitating access to existing markets for low-income citi-
zens, such as through cash aid, it should directly intervene
in order to provide goods and services in areas where they
were lacking. This approach could be seen as most akin
to the notion of “decommodified access to food” [24], on
a comparable level with other goods and services within a
social democratic welfare state model.
In discussing the effects of the NFSA, it is important
to note that the program has been fully implemented for
only a short period of time, therefore much of the data on
its effects, particularly in terms of long-term income or nu-
tritional health, remains inconclusive [22]. With this said,
the early returns from the program have shown promise in
terms of improving nutritional status and school attendance
amongst children, as well as alleviating extreme poverty in
rural communities [23]. Of course, the NFSA was only one
part of broader social reforms introduced by the Congress
government, in particular the Rural Employment Guarantee
program, all with intent of replacing, “the inefficient rationing
systems of the past with a universal entitlement” [18]. For
this reason, it is difficult to attribute gains in these areas to
one particular policy, as it may be that only the particular
interactions of these programs, as many are beneficiaries of
more than one, would create such outcomes. Nevertheless,
it does seem from the early data that NFSA has delivered
some, though by no means all, of the “food security” it
promised.
With that said, there have been a number of criticisms
raised about the Act, both from the political Right in India,
as well as the activists who initially pushed for the Act. Con-
servative commentators have expressed concern about the
costs and fiscal sustainability of the bill, as well as its lack
of targeting [25]. There have also been concerns raised
about the administrative capacity of poorer state govern-
ments to properly implement the provisions of the Act, as
well as the lack of controls on food quality within the Act [26].
Furthermore, some have questioned the NFSA’s seemingly
limited definition of “food security” as purely a matter of
caloric intake and meal provisions, rather than taking into
account both the environmental sustainability of the prac-
tices used to grow the additional food provisions and the
potential for making the country further dependent on food
imports, undermining a notion of food sovereignty in the
long-run [27]. Even though the Act notionally creates a
“right-based” form of food aid, by failing to grapple deci-
sively with the question of ownership and production, rather
than simply provision, it may be said to further a “sense of
charity, rather than economic rights”, as far as food aid is
concerned [8]. Finally, insofar as the NFSA is intended to
address poverty, it ignores the relational nature of at least a
portion of poverty; namely, those situations where, “extreme
vulnerability and the search for security allies the immediate
interests of poor people to those of their exploiters” [20].
Examples of this would include rural migrant laborers in
relation to their urban “recruiting agents”, a common sit-
uation across India. An approach to this sort of poverty,
which a system of social provision is not necessarily able to
address, would require recognition that, “social policy is not
just a battle over money and rights but also over principles
of social stratification” [21]. Though the NSFA is ambitious
in many ways, perhaps too ambitious for the existing admin-
istrative capacity in at least some parts of India, its inability
to touch certain social questions, along with its adherence
to a welfare state model which may diminish individual and
community autonomy, means it is ultimately less effective
than its initial proponents would have hoped.
4. The Brazilian Approach: Market Access as “Food
Security”
In contrast to the approach of the Indian government, the
Brazilian Bolsa Familia program, launched in 2003 by the
centre-left Workers’ Party (PT) government, takes a more
individualistic, market-based approach to the question of
both food security and social protection provision. As a part
of the larger Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) program (which in-
cludes selective provision of school meals and distribution of
nutritional supplements), one of the major stated goals of the
Bolsa is to address child malnutrition amongst low-income
families in Brazil. The program hopes to achieve this by
providing cash transfers directly to families (in most cases
to the female head of a household), on a conditional basis
for children attending school and receiving regular medical
checkups and vaccinations. In addition to immediate poverty
relief through the provision of monetary resources, the pro-
gram seeks to break the “cycle of poverty” by encouraging a
development of “human capital” amongst low-income Brazil-
ian through both the medical and educational conditions
imposed on recipients. To the extent that its governing logic
finds an echo within an earlier approach to social welfare, it
is oddly from the Ordo-liberal idea of a “social market econ-
omy”: that being a “notion of a market that was constantly
supported by political regulations and had to be flanked by
social intervention” [15]. The Indian NSFA’s central notion
is that markets, such as they exist, are not sufficient to pro-
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vide food security, and therefore the state must intervene to
both actively set food prices and to directly provide food aid.
Conversely, the Bolsa puts the emphasis on the ability of the
individual or family to access the market. The market itself
is not seen as the problem, except to the extent that it has
priced-out some consumers at the low-end. The correction
to this “market failure” is therefore to provide cash to those
consumers in order to facilitate their access to the market.
In other words, the Bolsa is fundamentally a demand-side
intervention, whereas the provisions of the NFSA are on the
supply side. To some extent, these differences of approach
may reflect concrete realities, such as a lack of private-
sector food providers in some rural areas of India, rather
than a fundamental philosophical difference. Still, given that,
as Lavinas points out, investment in “fundamental areas of
social provision” (for example, health, education and public
housing) has lagged economic growth in Brazil, there has
seemingly been a substitution of decommodified access
goods in favor of cash transfers [12]. Lavinas accuses this
approach of ignoring the act, that “the more universal so-
cial protection systems are the more redistributive in their
impact” [12], and that conditional programs like the Bolsa
may, unwittingly or not, undermine the solidarity necessary
for such systems to flourish.
An additional objection can be raised to the governing
logic of the Bolsa program in terms of the conditions at-
tached to the benefits. The advent of CCT as a preferred
social policy measure has been identified by some scholars
as being related to a “more productivist approach to social
assistance” [14], wherein recipients must demonstrate a
“return” on the “investment” the state is making by providing
the assistance, removing the logic of a universal right to
social protection. This “emphasis on the participants’ ac-
tive management of their risk through co-responsibility” [13]
may initially appear to be more emancipatory than purely
means-tested charity welfare, but insofar as it devolves the
responsibility for social protection to the individual level, it
can often reproduce the same stigmatizing features.
At the same time, with a note of caution that it is difficult
to isolate its effects from those of other reforms pursued
by the PT government, in particular a large increase in
the minimum wage, it should be recognized that the Bolsa
has been remarkably effective in achieving its stated goals.
Poverty, particularly of the extreme variety more character-
istic of rural areas of Brazil, has dropped, income inequality
has ticked downward slightly (though it remains among the
world’s highest) and educational attendance rates have in-
creased [28]. In specific terms of food consumption and
nutrition, the impacts were similarly impressive; Bolsa re-
cipient families reported that they consumed higher quality
food [29], had access to a greater variety of foods [30], and
had greater confidence in the ability to access food on a
long-term basis [31]. In particular, instances of medical
conditions related to nutritional deficiencies in children un-
der five were significantly decreased for families receiving
program benefits [32]. Though these effects can be easily
overstated in some ways, thereby making CCT measures a
social panacea, it does seem that, due to its relatively less
bureaucratic nature and the presence of a state apparatus
more able effectively implements the program. To some
extent, the program’s neoliberal features could be raised as
an example of what Ferguson describes as “appropriating
key elements of neoliberal reasoning for different ends”,
given that the overall picture of the program’s impact has
been in a direction of social redistribution [10].
5. Conclusion: The Problem of Governing
When considering the impacts of both the NFSA and the
Bolsa Familia as policies, it is curious to note that “in early
2008, the Indian Government was considering Bolsa Fa-
milia as an alternate to its wasteful food subsidies” [8],
before ultimately settling upon the institutional approach of
the NFSA, expanding and reforming the subsidy network
rather than getting rid of it outright. Whatever the reasoning
behind that ultimate decision, it does point to the reality that,
even when reaching different conclusions, governments
concerned with the issues of food security do consider a
variety of approaches.
The rights-based approach of the Food Security Act
has a potentially more empowering standpoint in relation
to its citizen-subjects. As well, it has a firm commitment
to invest directly in care work provisioning as opposed to
letting access to these services be dictated by the market.
However, its ability to achieve these goals is constrained
by the implementation capacity of the Indian state, as well
as cultural and other barriers. This has ultimately meant
that, though it remains problematic in terms of its governing
logic of “co-responsibility” and its emphasis on facilitating
market access to the exclusion of investment in core social
services (namely health care and education), the Brazil-
ian CCT-based approach has proven more successful at
achieving food security gains. This speaks to the merits of
the flexible nature and less complex implementation require-
ments of cash-aid approaches, building on observations
about the preferable nature of cash to direct food supplies
or vouchers in cases of famine relief [8]. At the same time,
this should not be taken to say that cash-based approaches
are inherently more effective in all contexts, and indeed that
too much of a focus on them may both neglect those areas
where existing markets, even given the ability to access
them, do not adequately provide for the needs of the pop-
ulation. An approach which combines the basis-in-rights
and universal principles of the Food Security Act with the
flexibility and less bureaucratic nature of the Bolsa Familia,
could more effectively address the set of concerns that, at
present, both programs are not fully able to.
Within this approach, it should be recognized that “redis-
tributive social policy (cash transfers) should not be played
off against social investment” [9], and that the development
of a wholly-articulated approach to food security requires in-
terventions on both the supply and demand sides. Perhaps
more importantly, insofar as “universalist social policies help
resolve other obstacles to solidarity and unity” [21], and to
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the extent that more targeted policies do not, the latter may
actually undermine the political basis for any kind of socially
redistributive policy, even if a means-tested intervention
may appear more effective initially. In order to see this, one
need only look to the fact that, whilst both Brazil and India
have experienced a change of government to a definitely
right-wing one, the Bolsa Familia has been exposed to a
much greater degree of rhetorical and political pushback,
with program funding extremely likely to be cut in the near
future. The NFSA, by contrast, has expanded to all the
states in India under auspices of the Modi government.
This is not to say that the critical question of administrative
capacity has been answered, however, and there remain
very real problems with the Act’s implementation. Ultimately,
the deficiencies in each approach point to the “absence of
a socialist art of government, and the historical failure of
the left to develop an autonomous governmentality compa-
rable to liberalism” [10]. As a result of this failure, specific
governments are then left to choose between previously
existent governmentalities which do not fully address the
issues they attempt to resolve. The development of such
governmentality, distant though it may seem in the current
context, may ultimately be the key to resolving the seeming
tensions embodied by the Indian and Brazilian experiences.
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